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Abstract 
Remunerative Work outside Public Service (RWOPS), although well legislated 
for in South Africa, lends itself to significant abuse by state-employed doctors.  
The abuse of RWOPS is a reflection of the failure of the state to regulate this 
practice, and, as the employer, to fulfil its obligations as regards distributive 
justice and the provision of health care services by regulating this practice. This 
is both legally and ethically unacceptable. The failure of the state to use the 
provisions of the Public Service Act No.103 of 1994 to regulate RWOPS and 
deal with the breach of employment contracts by doctors who abuse this 
practice is illegal. Doctors who abuse RWOPS lack altruism which is central to 
the social contract that exists between the medical profession and society.  
Such doctors are devoid of trustworthiness and integrity which are core virtues 
in the medical profession. The abuse of RWOPS primarily has an impact on the 
equitable access to health services, the quality of health care received by state 
patients and the efficient use of health resources. This abuse of RWOPS is 
clearly unethical. Accordingly, this report recommends that the Department of 
Health applies the provisions of the law and also reports doctors who abuse 
RWOPS to the HPCSA so that disciplinary action can be instituted against 
these unethical doctors. Moreover, the South African Medical Association 
should guide their members to understand the obligations they have towards 
their employer and their patients and to refrain from advocating for unethical 
doctors involved in illegal practices. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
Remunerative Work outside Public Service (RWOPS) is a privilege granted to 
employees of the state after fulfilling the obligations imposed on them by the Public 
Service Act1 and any other statutory law. This Act prescribes the conditions under 
which this privilege is granted. According to section 31 (1) of the Public Service 
Act, “No employee shall perform or engage himself or herself to perform 
remunerative work outside his or her employment in the relevant department, 
except with the written permission of the executive authority of the department”1. It 
is a requirement imposed on the executive authority before granting such 
permission to take into account whether or not the envisaged work outside the 
public service will interfere with or impede the employee’s efficiency and 
effectiveness in his or her functions. The executive authority should also consider 
whether or not the granting of such permission to perform work outside the public 
service will not constitute a contravention of the Code of Conduct for Public 
Service2,3 which prohibits employees of the state from engaging in any activity that 
will be in conflict with or infringes on the execution of their official duties as public 
servants. 
  
In this report I show that, although well legislated for in the Public Service Act1, the 
Public Service Act Regulations 4 and the Code of Conduct for the Public Service2, 
a plethora of reports exists on the abuse of RWOPS by public servants, and, more 
specifically, by doctors.  
 
1.2. Defining Remunerative Work Outside Public Service (RWOPS) 
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Remunerative Work Outside Public Service (RWOPS) is defined as “an activity that 
is performed outside the period which an employee must report on duty for the 
purpose of fulfilling a prescribed work week or outside a period of overtime or 
commuted overtime or standby duty that an employee has agreed to perform and 
for which the employee receives compensation in the form of salary, wage, 
allowance, honorarium or reward”5. Limited Private Practice (LPP) has been used 
interchangeably with RWOPS. Although there is no clear definition of LPP, the 
appropriate description of LPP is that it refers to the private work undertaken by 
state employed doctors on their own account whereas, with RWOPS, the private 
work is undertaken either on the doctor’s own account or that of another party. This 
means, in other words, in LPP, a state-employed doctor owns a private practice 
which is conducted outside the normal 40 hour week for a limited period of hours. 
 
RWOPS is referred to as “Dual Practice” or “Physician Dual Practice” in 
international literature6, 7. With reference to doctors, dual practice means “a 
situation where a public sector doctor establishes a private practice as an 
additional source of income”6 or “a situation where a physician combines clinical 
practice in the public service with a clinical practice in the private sector”7. For the 
purpose of this report, Remunerative Work outside Public Service and Dual 
Practice will be used interchangeably and will refer to a situation where state-
employed doctors perform remunerative clinical practice in the private sector in 
addition to their clinical practice in the public sector, either on the doctor’s own 
account or for another party. 
 
1.3. Literature Review 
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In this section, I provide a brief overview of the abuse of RWOPS by state-employed 
doctors and this will be expanded upon in the chapters that follow. As far back as 
2004, the problem of the abuse of RWOPS in South Africa was found to be severe in 
Gauteng, where 50% of specialist doctors own private clinics8. It was found that the 
majority of these doctors worked only for an average of four hours at public health 
facilities before leaving to consult patients in their private clinics and, consequently, 
they were not available to render their required services at the hospitals in which they 
were employed8. In general, it is estimated that over 90% of state-employed doctors in 
South Africa engage in RWOPS at least to some degree9. International studies have 
also documented the existence, as well as the prevalence, of RWOPS in low, middle 
and high-income countries alike10, 11. According to these studies, up to 80% of public 
sector doctors in Bangladesh engage in some form of RWOPS, and a similar 
proportion for doctors in Indonesia and Egypt has been reported10, 11. It is also 
estimated that 69% of public sector doctors in Thailand engage in private sector 
activities, while, in the UK, 63% of public hospital consultants and specialists maintain 
a private practice alongside their job in the National Health Service10’11.  
 
The reasons for doctors engaging in RWOPS are not well studied. “For low-income 
and middle-income countries evidence shows that physicians engage in dual practice 
as a result of low public sector salaries, which either do not allow for a comfortable 
standard of living or do not even exceed the minimum costs of living”12. In low and 
middle-income countries, dual practice can, thus, be viewed as a possible system 
solution to problems such as limited financial resources to reimburse doctors 
appropriately in the public health care sector. In developed countries, private practice 
was seen as offering a range of rewards, including financial benefits, increase in 
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strategic influence, clinical autonomy, a greater sense of being valued, and more 
opportunities to realise one’s individual aspirations as a clinician6. The blurring of 
boundaries between the individuals’ public practice obligations and their private 
income generating activities gives rise to  ethical and legal concerns  owing to 
RWOPS being prone to corruption and unethical behaviour13.  
 
1.4. Aim and objectives of the report 
The aim of this report is to explore the ethical and legal implications of the abuse of 
remunerative work outside public service by state-employed doctors against South 
Africa’s ethico-legal framework in the healthcare context. The objectives of the report 
are as follows:   
1. To describe the ethical and legal obligations of state employed doctors toward 
patients;     
2. To describe the legal and regulatory framework for RWOPS; 
3. To explore the notion of corruption and demonstrate that abuse of RWOPS 
equates to corrupt and unethical doctors; and 
4. To describe the impact of the abuse of RWOPS on service delivery and the training 
of undergraduate medical students, medical interns and registrars. 
 
    1.5. Research question and outline of the report 
Although many attempts have been made to regulate the practice of RWOPS in South 
Africa using the current regulatory framework, these have not been successful.  As a 
result, there are a large number of anecdotal reports of abuse of the system by public 
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servants, including doctors who practice RWOPS, as stated earlier. My research 
question is, thus: Can Remunerative Work outside Public Service as currently 
practiced by most state-employed doctors be ethically and legally justified? My 
research report demonstrates that RWOPS as currently practised by most doctors 
cannot be ethically and legally justified. I argue that, in the current climate, RWOPS 
lends itself to significant ethically and legally unacceptable abuse.  
 
Prior to embarking on an in-depth normative analysis of the ethical and legal 
implications of the abuse of RWOPS, an appreciation of the regulatory framework for 
RWOPS is necessary, and chapter 2 of my report focuses on the legal and regulatory 
framework available for the management of RWOPS in South Africa. In this chapter, I 
show that, although empowered to do so by the law, the state has failed to control and 
regulate the practice of RWOPS, and, as a result, the practice is abused by many 
doctors, and, hence, patients’ constitutional rights to access health care services are 
infringed. I further argue that an additional consequence is that the state, i.e. through 
the Provincial Departments of Health in particular, has failed to discharge its obligation 
to execute the principle of distributive justice in the provision of health care services to 
the people of South Africa. As professionals, besides having legal obligations in terms 
of their employment contracts with the state, doctors also have ethical obligations 
towards their patients. The objective of chapter 3 is, therefore, to explore these ethical 
and legal obligations. I also explore the legal requirements of doctors’ employment 
contracts and their obligations towards their patients, starting with the supreme law of 
the country, the Constitution, and pertinent statutory provisions of Parliament. I argue 
that the abuse of RWOPS is a breach of the employment contract and is consequently 
illegal. I further argue that the remuneration received by doctors who abuse RWOPS 
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either through state salaries or RWOPS activities is in line with the notion of “perverse 
incentives” so making the conduct of these doctors unethical in terms of the ethical 
guidelines of the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA). Chapter 4 
focuses on the impact of the abuse of RWOPS on health services access and equity, 
the quality of health care and the efficient use of health resources. I argue that doctors 
who abuse RWOPS are not only unethical but are also corrupt as they steal resources 
from the public sector for individual gain. I also claim that the impact of abuse of 
RWOPS will not be felt only by this generation but also by future generations as there 
is underinvestment in future doctors owing to a lack of teaching, training and 
mentoring.  
 
In my arguments, I demonstrate that the Department of Health (Provincial 
Departments), as the employer, and the HPCSA, as a regulatory body for health 
professionals including doctors, has failed in its mandate of respectively regulating the 
practice of RWOPS and of giving guidance to the medical profession in this practice. 
Moreover, where the state has intervened it has not done so in a uniform manner. On 
the basis of my arguments I conclude that, despite this practice being well legislated 
for, its abuse is perpetuated because of; inter alia, the cross-country heterogeneity in 
the state’s responses to this abuse.  
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CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR REMUNERATIVE WORK 
OUTSIDE PUBLIC SERVICE (RWOPS) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa14 is the supreme law of the country, 
and it establishes the substance of the statutory provisions of all the Acts of 
Parliament. Enshrined in the Constitution is the Bill of Rights which gives every citizen 
the right of access to health care services. In this chapter I demonstrate that the 
Department of Health has been empowered by legislation to regulate the performance 
of RWOPS by state-employed doctors, and I argue that, although the Department is 
empowered in this way, it has failed in executing this role. I further argue that the 
South African Medical Association (SAMA), as a representative body of the majority of 
doctors in South Africa, has failed to abide by the resolutions of the Public Service 
Coordinating and Bargaining Council. My arguments are based on the Constitution14, 
the Public Service Act1, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act15 and the Labour 
Relations Act16, and I now look at the relevant aspects of each of these Acts to argue 
my case. 
 
2.2. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa14 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution contains the Bill of Rights and amongst the rights therein 
is the right of everyone to have access to health care services. According to section 
27(1) (a) of the Constitution, “everyone has the right to have access to health care 
services, including reproductive health care”14. In terms of section 28(1) (c), “every 
child has the right to basic health care services”14. The Department of Health has been 
mandated by the Constitution, in section 27(2), to take reasonable legislative and 
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other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of 
the right of everyone to have access to health care services, including reproductive 
health care.  
 
The right to have access to health care is a positive right, and is, therefore, not 
realised if the correlative obligation imposed on the Department of Health to provide 
sufficient resources, including human resources, is not honoured. Doctors are a 
significant human resource component in terms of this right. For the accessibility of 
medical services to be a reality, doctors need to be available at their work stations at 
the specified times of service delivery to render medical services. The Mail and 
Guardian17 reported on the experience of a doctor in one of the academic hospitals in 
South Africa who witnessed two patients dying because the doctors employed to 
oversee their care had left the responsibility to their junior and desperate colleagues 
while they were at their nearby private practices at major private hospitals in the city. 
This was further echoed by the Northern Review18 which reported that operations are 
sometimes postponed owing to the non-availability of the specialists to operate or give 
anaesthesia. It further reported that doctors disappeared during the daytime leaving 
patients waiting for long periods and also that specialists refused to come out at night 
when they were on call. These media reports provide some of the anecdotal evidence 
that RWOPS is not well managed by the Department of Health, and patients are 
consequently denied access to medical services because doctors are not at their work 
stations. It is my argument that this denial infringes on the patients’ constitutional 
rights of access to health care services. 
 
2.3. Public Service Act 103 of 19941 
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 Permission to perform RWOPS is one of the privileges that state employees, 
appointed under the Public Service Act, have. This Act makes a provision for state 
employees, including doctors, to perform RWOPS under certain conditions. According 
to Section 30 of this Act, “no employee shall perform or engage himself to perform 
remunerative work outside his/her employment in the relevant department, except with 
the written permission of the executive authority of the department”1. It further gives 
guidance to the executive authority to take into account whether or not the outside 
work would not potentially interfere with or impede the effective or efficient 
performance of the employee’s functions in the department or constitute a 
contravention of the code of conduct for employees in the public service. According to 
this Act, the executive authority has only thirty (30) days to respond to any request by 
employees for permission to engage in RWOPS, and, if there is no response after 30 
days, the employee should consider the permission to engage in RWOPS to have 
been granted1.  
 
It is, therefore, the responsibility of the doctor who intends to engage in RWOPS to 
apply for permission before engaging is such a practice. The employer also has the 
responsibility of responding to the request within 30 days, and the response can either 
be positive, where permission is granted, or negative, where permission is not 
granted.  A lack of response within 30 days or silence on the side of the employer, 
though, means that consent has been granted. In the light of the Public Service Act, it 
is my opinion that the challenge that South Africa faces today is threefold;  
(a) doctors performing RWOPS without first seeking permission to do so;   
(b) executive authorities not responding to requests by doctors to engage in RWOPS; 
and  
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(c)  doctors being granted permission to perform RWOPS not adhering to the 
conditions of the approval to perform RWOPS.  
It becomes clear, therefore, that a well legislated practice could be abused because of 
the failures of not only doctors but also the employer to observe the provisions of the 
Public Service Act. Based on this abuse, some of the provincial departments have 
considered a total ban on the practice of RWOPS rather than declining individual 
applications or requests19. The effecting of the ban has been through the issuing of 
circulars. In my opinion, however, the banning of RWOPS through circulars is illegal 
as it is in contravention of section 30 of the Public Service Act that regulates RWOPS 
in South Africa. 
 
In terms of section 31 of the Public Service Act, any remuneration received by doctors 
who engage in RWOPS without the permission of the employer is “unauthorized 
remuneration“1. This section further gives a directive on measures to be taken against 
doctors found guilty of this offence. It states that this unauthorized remuneration 
should be paid by the said employee into the state revenue and that, if the employee 
fails to do this, the unauthorized remuneration may be recovered by way of legal 
proceedings or any other manner as approved by the treasury1. Although the state is 
empowered by this section of the Public Service Act to clamp down on any abuse of 
RWOPS by state employed doctors, anecdotal evidence shows that the state has 
failed to do so. In 2013 the Kwazulu-Natal Department of Health conducted an in-
depth forensic investigation which revealed that 101 doctors employed full time by the 
department in mainly rural areas were running private practices in urban areas and 
were claiming in excess of R22 million from the Discovery Medical Scheme alone for 
treating private patients20. This means that the department was aware of who these 
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doctors were and how much each had claimed from the Discovery Medical Scheme. 
Despite this, however, the Head of Department of KZN Health, Dr Sibongile Zungu, 
said, ‘We have handed our forensic report to the National Minister and await his 
recommendations on the way forward’20. The Public Service Act stipulates that, if 
there is unauthorized remuneration, the department must recover it and pay it into the 
revenue. Dr Zungu, however, decided otherwise and referred the matter to the 
National Minister of Health. Nothing further has been heard in relation to this matter. It 
is my argument that, by failing to implement the provisions of the Public Service Act, 
the state is fuelling the abuse of RWOPS by state-employed doctors in South Africa 
and must also share the blame for the abuse of RWOPS in this country.  It follows that 
the state has failed to safeguard state resources and to ensure that these resources 
are used for the benefit of all South Africans, especially those who rely on the state for 
health care services. Hence, the state has failed in its obligations as regards 
‘distributive justice’ as described by Beauchamp and Childress21, a fair, equitable, and 
appropriate distribution of rights and responsibilities in society21. South Africa already 
suffers from an unequal distribution of doctors between the well–resourced private 
sector with almost 70% of the doctors and the poorly-resourced public sector with the 
remaining 30% for almost 85% of the population22. This is further complicated by the 
distributional disparities between urban and rural areas22. In ensuring the progressive 
realisation of the right of access to health care services, the state has been entrusted 
with the responsibility of the rationing and allocation of this scarce resource within the 
public service. The example above is evidence that the state is failing in its 
responsibility to hold these unethical doctors accountable and is as guilty as the 
doctors with regard to breaches in ethics.  
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2.4. Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 75 of 199715 
The Department of Labour, through the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 
regulates working time for all employees. According to section 9 of this Act, “an 
employer may not require or permit an employee to work more than 45 hours in any 
week; and nine hours in any day”15. Hence, most public servants employed on a full 
time basis work for  eight hours a day and 40 hours per week. For those employees 
who cannot dedicate eight hours of their day to public service, the Department of 
Public Service and Administration22 has made a provision for flexible working patterns 
with more flexible hours as a means of managing peaks and troughs of work more 
efficiently and effectively and, further, provide working conditions which are more 
responsive to the employers’ and the employees’ needs. This can be through part time 
employment on either the 3/8th (working 3 out of the 8 hours per day), 5/8th (working 5 
out of 8 hours per day) or 6/8th (working 6 of 8 hours per day) basis  with sessional 
employment being allowed from a minimum of one hour per week to 20 hours per 
week.  
 
The Public Service Commission8 in its report revealed that the rate of abuse of official 
time is so severe that the majority of doctors work only an average of four hours in the 
state before they leave to consult their private patients.  While it is obvious that these 
doctors, although contracted for eight hours per day, are failing to fulfil their 
contractual obligations, the state allows them to continue working on full time contracts 
instead of amending their contracts to either part time or sessional ones. This 
demonstrates that doctors are abusing the privilege granted to them by the state to 
perform RWOPS, and, because of greed, some doctors are acting unethically by 
transgressing the rules and neglecting their responsibilities towards the state for the 
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sake of personal gain23. When ‘Mammon’ (money or material wealth associated with 
greedy pursuit of gain) beckons, these doctors are unable to resist the temptation 
even while earning decent salaries and having good retirement prospects23.  
 
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence from media reports suggests that doctors are 
engaging in RWOPS during official hours when they are supposed to be at their 
workstations to serve patients in public sector facilities20, 24, and 25. In addition some 
doctors do not even submit applications for permission to engage in RWOPS and 
continue to engage in the practice without permission20, 24, and 25. There is, however, no 
available information as to whether action has been taken against those doctors even 
after forensic investigations have been conducted and even when it is well known by 
their managers that they are abusing the practice of RWOPS. The state could recover 
the remuneration received through the abuse of RWOPS or force these doctors to 
change their employment contracts from full time to either part time or sessional 
contracts. Based on this, I submit that the Department of Health (Provincial 
Departments), as the employer of these doctors, is failing to safeguard the resources 
of the state to ensure that there is access to health care services by all in South Africa 
as these doctors are paid for work that they do not do.  
 
 After the implementation of Occupation Specific Dispensation in 2009, there was a 
remarkable improvement in the salary of doctors, and now the entry level salary of 
doctors, inclusive of overtime or total cost to employer, is at R657 683 for a Medical 
Officer Grade 1 and maximum of R 2 035 646.37 for a Head of a Clinical Department 
Grade 226. This confirms that state employed doctors are earning good salaries as a 
result of the state fulfilling its obligations to the employment contract. According to 
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Kant’s Categorical Imperative, people should not be treated as a means to an end 
only but always as an end in itself27. State-employed doctors cannot claim that the 
state treats them as a means to an end as the state reimburses the doctors 
appropriately for this service. Unfortunately doctors who abuse RWOPS do not 
reciprocate this. They enter into a contract with the state to work eight hours per day 
knowing very well that they are not going to work those eight hours as they also have 
commitments to see private patients. Using the Kant Categorical Imperative analysis, 
it is clear that the state is treated as a means to an end by doctors who abuse 
RWOPS.  Their behaviour is unethical and morally unconscionable.  
 
 2.5. Labour Relations Act, 66 of 199516 
Section 35 of the Labour Relations Act gives effect to the establishment of the Public 
Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC). The PSCBC is an independent 
organisation with the main objective of maintaining good labour relations in the Public 
Service through collective bargaining between the employer and employee 
representatives (trade unions) resulting in collective agreements/resolutions28.  The 
Disciplinary Code and Procedures for the Public Service (PSCBC Resolution 1 of 
2003)29 is one of the collective agreements reached in 2003. This resolution lists acts 
of misconduct of which an employee may be found guilty and so be subjected to the 
provisions of the code. Some of the acts of misconduct listed in this code are when an 
employee:  
“(a) fails to comply with, or contravenes, an Act, regulation or legal obligation;  
(b) absents or repeatedly absents himself/herself from work without reason or 
permission or without written approval from his or her department; and  
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(c) performs work for compensation in a private capacity for another person or 
organisation either during or outside working hours”29.  
 
Currently, the South African Medical Association (SAMA) is admitted into the PSCBC 
under the auspices of its sister union, the Democratic Nursing Organisation of South 
Africa (DENOSA) 28. This means that SAMA is party to the Disciplinary Code and 
Procedures for the Public Service and has a duty to guide its members accordingly. 
Furthermore, in 2009 the abolition of limited private practice (LPP) was tabled and 
agreed to in the PSCBC and endorsed by the political leadership of the health sector. 
Although SAMA declared a dispute which went up for arbitration by the Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) in September 1999, the 
Department of Health and SAMA reached an agreement under the auspices of the 
CCMA to abolish LPP unconditionally from the 31 December 1999 and the parties 
were confident that the agreement reached was in the best interest of the public30, 31. 
The implication of this agreement is that, from 31 December 1999, no doctor 
employed full-time by the state can simultaneously own a private practice. But in 
defending its members, SAMA ignores this agreement as Dr Phophi Ramathuba of 
SAMA was quoted in News2432 as rejecting the announcement of the department of 
health to charge doctors who are members of SAMA for running private practices. 
According to Dr Ramathuba, “there is no legislation that prohibits state employed 
doctors from running private practices”32, .This is a clear indication that SAMA is not 
abiding by the agreement made in the PSCBC.  This agreement is binding on all full-
time state-employed doctors and those who currently own private practices are in 
contravention of this agreement. Public service managers, including managers in 
clinical services, are not only empowered by the Public Service Act but by the PSCBC 
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resolutions and agreements to take action against any doctor contravening these 
agreements as these resolutions are binding on both the employer and employees 
represented by their unions. 
 
2.6. Concluding Remarks 
I have demonstrated that the Department of Health, as the employer, fully empowered 
by legislation, has failed to manage the performance of RWOPS by state-employed 
doctors, and some of the doctors are exploiting the gap that exists owing to this failure.  
Both the state and doctors are culpable as regards breaches of the Constitution, 
Public Service Act, Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Labour Relations Act.  
In the chapter that follows, I discuss the ethical and legal obligations of doctors 
towards their patients. 
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 CHAPTER 3: ETHICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF DOCTORS TOWARDS 
THEIR PATIENTS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I now briefly discuss the ethical and legal obligations of doctors towards 
their patients. Health care practice is a moral and social contract between health 
professionals and the public that they undertake to take care of 33. Doctors employed 
in the public sector are legally bound to use their knowledge, skills and expertise  for 
patients seeking care at those facilities. Ethically, the best interests of the patient 
ought to be of paramount importance to doctors. 
3.2. Legal obligations 
The relationship between doctors and their patients should be consensual, and it is 
often described as contractual34. Once created, this relationship imposes legal 
obligations and duties. In the public service, patients have a contractual relationship 
with the hospital, and the state delegates that responsibility through an employment 
contract to doctors as professionals to treat the patients. As employees of the state, 
doctors are expected to be faithful to the Republic and honour the Constitution in the 
execution of their daily duties and to put the public interests first in the execution of 
these duties. Doctors have a legal obligation to place their undivided attention, time, 
skills and expertise at the disposal of the state as the employer1. Doctors on full time 
contracts should dedicate eight hours per day and 40 hours per week using their 
knowledge, skills and expertise to treat patients in the public health facilities where the 
state has placed them. By virtue of their contracts with the public service as the 
employer, doctors employed by the state have a legal duty to fulfil the obligations of 
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their contracts, and failure to do so equates to a breach of the contract and is, 
therefore, illegal. That is why, in terms of the Public Service Act, it is mandatory for 
doctors who intend to engage in RWOPS to obtain prior approval to perform RWOPS 
outside official hours so that the interests of both the Public Service and the 
community are not prejudiced. 
  According to the Code of Conduct for Public Service2, doctors, as employees of the 
state, are prohibited from engaging in any transaction or action that is in conflict with, 
or infringes on, the execution of their official duties. It is clear from this and other 
anecdotal evidence that doctors abusing RWOPS are guilty of contravening this 
aspect of the law regulating their employment contract with the state. If the breaching 
of a contract is illegal and the abuse of RWOPS by state-employed doctors is 
equivalent to the breach of their employment contracts, the abuse of RWOPS by state-
employed doctors is illegal. 
3.3. Ethical obligations of doctors as professionals 
As human beings, doctors have unacquired natural duties and they owe these duties 
to society as a whole35. This obligation is unrelated to their professional qualifications. 
As professionals, though, doctors have moral obligations acquired by being qualified 
and licensed as professionals by the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA) which requires them to regard concern for the best interests or well-being of 
their patients as their primary professional duty. Professional ethics emphasises the 
principle of beneficence rather than just non-maleficence and describes health care as 
a moral obligation in a good society where it represents a sense of caring for the 
community36. That is why, before commencing with the practice of their profession, 
doctors cite the Hippocratic Oath37 or modernised versions of it, thereby making a 
public promise that they will place the interests of their patients above their own. The 
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two closing sentences of the original Oath, which were removed from its modern 
version known as the Declaration of Geneva38, are worth mentioning here. “While I 
continue to keep this Oath unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the 
practice of the Art, respected by all men, in all times. But should I trespass and violate 
this Oath, may the reverse be my lot”37. I agree with Miles that the content of these 
two closing sentences of the Hippocratic Oath speak of two moral issues. “First, it 
defines several distinct ways by which a doctor is to understand how these vows are 
binding. This means that the doctor must not commit perjury, blur or confound the 
words, and must not transgress against the vows. Second, doctors swear to stand 
under the judgement of all human beings for time eternal and openly invite the public 
to judge them for any breach of the vows they make when citing and signing the 
Hippocratic Oath”37. Cruess and Cruess39, 40 describe becoming a doctor as an 
invitation for public scrutiny. It is from this Oath that ethical codes of conduct for 
doctors were derived to guide them in achieving the highest standards of their 
profession. These ethical codes are also based on the ethical principles of 
beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for persons and autonomy. Altruism and ethical 
conduct should always serve as a backdrop against which medicine is practised.  
 
The HPCSA as a statutory body, established under the auspices of the Health 
Professions Act41, is mandated to set ethical and professional standards for the 
conduct of practitioners registered under the Act, including doctors. The HPCSA has 
developed guidelines for good practice in the health care professions which have been 
formulated into booklets. Among the core ethical values and standards required of 
health care practitioners are:  
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“(a) Best interests and well-being of the patients which requires health care 
practitioners to act in the best interest of the patients even when the interests of the 
latter conflict with their own personal interests;  
(b) integrity which requires health care practitioners to incorporate these ethical values 
and standards as the foundation for their character and practice as responsible health 
care providers;  
(c) truthfulness which requires health care practitioners to regard truth and truthfulness 
as the basis of trust in their professional relationships with patients; and  
(d) justice which requires health care practitioners to treat all individuals and groups in 
an impartial , fair and just manner”35.  
 
Although ethics has moved from virtue-based ethics to principle-based ethics over the 
centuries27, it is important to note that the HPCSA still recognises virtue ethics as 
integral to the practice of the health professions. Integrity, for example, is a 
commendable character trait that will make one entrust one’s life to an individual who 
possesses this character trait. Trustworthiness as a virtue would make the employer 
trust that a doctor would adhere to the conditions agreed upon when the permission to 
perform RWOPS was granted.  
 
The HPCSA uses these and other core ethical values and standards to determine 
whether practitioners have acted unprofessionally and to take remedial actions against 
the guilty verdicts. It is clear that doctors abusing RWOPS fall short of upholding these 
core ethical values as prescribed by the HPCSA. Although there is anecdotal evidence 
of abuse of RWOPS, however, there are no available reports on doctors being brought 
before the disciplinary committees of the HPCSA for abusing RWOPS42.  
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In my opinion, remuneration received through the abuse of RWOPS is equivalent to a 
“perverse incentive” as defined by the HPCSA. The HPCSA defines a perverse 
incentive as “money or any other form of compensation, payment, reward or benefit 
which is not legally due or which is given on the understanding, whether expressed, 
implied or tacit, that the recipient will engage or refrain from engaging in certain 
behaviour in a manner which is either: illegal; and/or contrary to ethical or professional 
rules; and/or which in the opinion of the HPCSA may adversely affect the interest of a 
patient or a group of patients”43. According to this definition, when doctors receive 
salaries as full-time doctors despite not having fulfilled their full-time contractual 
obligations, the salaries received are “perverse incentives”; and, when doctors 
abandon patients in public health facilities to treat patients in their private clinics, the 
income received from such private activities is “perverse incentive” as well. As stated 
above, this is what the Public Service Act refers to as “unauthorised remuneration” 
which the state can recover from the doctors engaging in RWOPS without permission. 
If “perverse incentives” are unethical in accordance with the guidelines of the HPCSA, 
doctors who abuse RWOPS conduct themselves unethically. 
 
The abuse of RWOPS has altered the perception of a profession that has always been 
known for its benevolence, altruism, honesty and integrity to that of a profession that is 
now known for self-interest. Opportunities for doctors to obtain high incomes have 
caused financial pursuits to triumph over professional responsibility and ethics for 
many doctors44. According to Cruess and Cruess40, “the principal threats to medicine’s 
professional status come from public mistrust of the profession as a whole”. They 
further state that there are two factors that contribute to this mistrust, and these are, 
“public perception that medicine failed to self-regulate in a way that can guarantee 
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competence and that it puts its own interest above that of patients and the public”40. 
This was echoed by Dhai and McQuoid-Mason33 who cited financial pursuit as one of 
the failures of professionalism with concomitant adverse media coverage undermining 
public trust in the medical profession. As currently practised by many, RWOPS has 
altered the behaviour of some doctors, and altruism has been eroded from this group 
of medical professionals because the focus is no longer on the well-being and the best 
interest of the patients, but rather on what is best for the doctors. The abuse of 
RWOPS is a threat to the status of medicine as a profession as the behaviour of 
doctors falls short of what should define the medical profession. As Stevens argues 
relative to the perceived crisis of moral leadership in American health care, the 
medical profession has been socially reclassified, “moving from the role of benevolent 
public agent towards that of self-interested players in the economic market place”45.  
3.4. Concluding remarks 
Doctors who abuse RWOPS have deviated from their moral duties towards their 
patients and are also in breach of not only their legal obligations towards the state but 
also the ethical guidelines of the HPCSA as the regulatory body. The abuse of 
RWOPS has an impact on health service access and equity, quality of care and 
efficiency of use of health resources as I will discuss in detail in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4:  IMPACT OF THE ABUSE OF RWOPS 
4.1. Introduction 
RWOPS or Dual Practice is not restricted to doctors; other health professionals and 
non-health professionals employed by the state may perform or undertake work 
outside their public employment.  RWOPS by doctors, however, attracts the most 
interest because it has the greatest potential to impact negatively on the quality of 
care provided to both public and private patients, and this is a concern for all 
individuals. Although there is a paucity of literature relating to the context of economics 
on the topic of RWOPS and its effects on the public service because this subject is still 
in its infancy in this discipline, there is agreement amongst most health economists 
that dual practice/RWOPS has both positive and negative effects on the equity, 
efficiency and quality of health care provision. There is, however, still no consensus on 
its net effect6, 46. While it is challenging to write with confidence about the impact of 
abuse of RWOPS in South Africa because evidence-based information on this subject 
is limited, the impact of the abuse of RWOPS, nevertheless, is apparent from available 
anecdotal evidence20, 24, 25, 31, 32 and 42.  
In South Africa, where there is a shortage of medical doctors and specialists, a well-
regulated dual practice would probably improve health service access and possibly its 
efficiency. But because of the poor regulation of this practice as demonstrated earlier, 
it lends itself to abuse by state-employed doctors, and its positive impact cannot be 
realized. The impact of abuse of RWOPS is felt on health service access and 
distributive justice, quality of care and efficiency of use of health resources47, and I 
now look at the impact of the abuse of RWOPS in these three areas. 
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4.2. Impact of abuse of RWOPS on health service access and distributive 
justice 
The South African public health system suffers from a lack of resources, both human 
and otherwise, which are readily available in the private health system48. As a result, 
the waiting lists for interventions on patients become unacceptably long and some of 
the patients suffer complications and even die while still awaiting their turn49. In a well-
regulated environment, dual practice provides an alternative not only to these long 
waiting lists, but also to the crowded public facilities. But the abuse of RWOPS masks 
all the potential benefits and perpetuates the negative consequences of this practice. 
While there are several other causes for a lack of access to quality health care in the 
state sector, these do not relate directly to the subject matter of this research report 
and, therefore, will not be discussed. 
“Patients complain about the shortage of doctors and long queues at hospitals while 
doctors are paid for a whole day’s work but they run, pretending to be going on tea 
breaks, whereas they are going to see patients at their private practices”42. This is one 
of the symptoms of unregulated RWOPS practice. Absenteeism and shirking during 
official work hours have been described as the potential negative impacts, not only of 
the abuse of RWOPS, but of the practice itself, which only becomes worse in an 
unregulated environment. “The core hours required for the occupational class of 
medical practitioner, (as distinct from overtime) including all ranks and specialties, are 
between 07:00/08:00 and 15:30/16:30, from Mondays to Fridays. These core hours 
reflect the pattern of practice in most disciplines, and they coincide with the times 
when all the support staff and other resources required for efficient patient care are in 
place and functioning at an optimal level”8. When doctors perform RWOPS during 
these core hours they are simply stealing from the coffers of the public service as the 
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state pays them for the hours that they are not working, while they generate income 
from their private work.  The consequence of this is that patients who are entitled to 
receive health care from the public health system are denied access to health services 
as doctors are not in their workstations because they are busy treating their private 
patients during official hours. This leads to inequity in the access to health care 
services as many of the resources, including those human resources which are meant 
for patients who solely depend on the public health system, are channelled towards 
the private health care system. This is clearly an erosion of the principle of distributive 
justice as described earlier. This practice by state-employed doctors is that of stealing 
public time for private gain, and is equivalent to “corruption” as these doctors are 
abusing the power entrusted to them, for public gain50. Doctors, by virtue of their 
profession, have the trust of the community based on a social contract that exists 
between the medical profession and society. In this contract, society has granted the 
medical profession autonomy in the practice of the profession, monopoly in the 
utilisation of the knowledge base of the profession, the privilege to self-regulate and to 
be rewarded both financially and non-financially. In return, society expects the medical 
professionals to put the best interests of their patients above their own self-interest 
and to demonstrate morality and integrity39, 40. This contract is similar to the one that 
exists between politicians and citizens. The citizens expect the politicians to act in their 
best interests and not their own interest. Like politicians, doctors are also afforded high 
social status and are expected to practise their profession and exercise their 
professional medical judgement without being influenced by personal financial 
interests. In terms of the HPCSA guidelines as stated above, this is equivalent to 
“perverse incentives” which is also known as “improper financial gain” which is illegal. 
Perverse incentives are unethical and punishable according to the HPCSA, and 
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doctors who steal public time for private gain are unethical and should be disciplined 
by the HPCSA.  
 Doctors who steal public time to perform RWOPS during official hours are corrupt and 
unethical as they are driven by self-interest and perverse incentives.  Unfortunately, 
the actions of these doctors have severe consequences not only for access and 
equity, but for the quality and effectiveness of health care services as well, as I 
elucidate in the section that follows. 
4.3. Impact of abuse of RWOPS on quality of care 
The ability to generate additional income for doctors and other health workers while 
minimising the budgetary burden on the public sector to retain skilled staff, especially 
given the scarcity of resources in the public sector, has been cited among the positive 
outcomes of RWOPS51. The quality of care provided does not only depend on the 
skills of the providers but also on the ability of the skilled providers to transfer those 
skills to others through education and training as these guarantee skilled professionals 
in the future. All state-employed doctors in South Africa are salaried through a 
Personal and Salary Administration System (Persal System) irrespective of their 
employment contract. The moment personal and other information is entered on the 
Persal system the system will run as instructed until new information is entered. The 
monitoring system for work attendance is extremely poor or non-existent, and, as a 
result, these doctors still receive full salaries even if they  are absent from their public 
service work stations. Because income in private practice is on fee for service, 
whereas income in public practice is on Persal, most of the doctors involved in 
RWOPS end up abandoning patients in the public service for fee for service patients in 
the private service, but they still receive the income for the patients that they have 
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abandoned in the public service. This puts the doctors involved in RWOPS in a tricky 
position as they have to negotiate potential conflicts of interest between the two 
components of their work52. They may be manipulative and compromise the quality of 
services in the public sector in order to encourage a diversion of patients to the private 
sector in order to increase their income resulting in criticism from fellow doctors like 
the angry Dr Caldwell who was quoted in the KZN Health Bulletin by saying, “they 
have a sense of entitlement: the state ‘owes them’. What about the patients they are 
cheating; the state resources they are abusing; the junior doctors without supervision? 
...Offenders are conspicuous by their absence: unsupportive of junior doctors, late or 
absent at meetings, unavailable for outreach. The examples they set to their juniors 
are followed; the next generation of specialists qualify and do the same thing: get full-
time consultant posts and open private practices…”20. These statements by Dr 
Caldwell sum up most of the consequences of the abuse of RWOPS and what is 
important is the example that is set to be followed by future doctors. 
 
The Public Service Commission probe into RWOPS abuse in Gauteng’s health 
services revealed that more than 50% of specialists own private practices8. Of the 
eight medical schools in South Africa, three are in Gauteng, meaning that Gauteng 
contributes significantly to the training of doctors, registrars and interns. According to 
the then Head of SAMA’s Specialist Private Practice Committee, Dr Mbokota, tertiary 
hospitals, where most of the doctors’ training occurs, are ‘haemorrhaging’ specialist 
skills to RWOPS.  He argued further that, “Besides the cost to service delivery, 
registrars were not being properly supervised, meaning that, when they qualify, they 
lack sufficiently honed skills”53. The training of medical interns is equally affected by 
the absence of senior doctors to supervise them, and these interns move to a year of 
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community service lacking sufficient skills and competence to work independently in 
remote hospitals of the country. This underinvestment in future doctors will not only be 
felt by this generation, but also by future generations. Absence of specialists and 
senior doctors generally also undermines the quality of health care as the state relies 
on the ill-trained doctors for the provision of health care services. There are also 
arguments that RWOPS has benefits for the training of registrars given the shortage of 
facilities including state of the art equipment in the public service. It is true that public 
service suffers from a shortage of not only doctors and state of the art equipment, but 
also of basic equipment54. Unfortunately, in most cases the equipment is available, but 
in a non-functional state. According to Professor Ken Boffard, from the Surgical 
Department at the University of Witwatersrand, the training of fellows and registrars is 
no longer solely using public sector facilities. He further claimed that MRI training 
would not be possible without the private sector53. Although the abuse of RWOPS has 
negative effects on the training of registrars and junior doctors, RWOPS in a well 
regulated environment can contribute positively to the training of quality future doctors 
and specialists.  
I have demonstrated that the abuse of RWOPS by state employed doctors 
compromises the quality of care given to patients. The poor quality, or even absence, 
of training of junior doctors has serious consequences for health care provision in 
South Africa as a whole, and the effect of this will be felt not only by the current 
generation but by future generations as well. 
 
 
 
31 
 
4.4. Impact of abuse of RWOPS on the efficient  use of health resources 
South Africa has a two-tiered health care system with the public health system being 
utilised for those who cannot afford the private health care system, although even 
those who are categorised as the poor in the community utilize the private health care 
system for out-patient services and the public health system for in-patient services 
owing, amongst other things, to long waiting times in public health facilities 55. In an 
environment that is well regulated, like Indonesia, dual practice increased the use of 
services at public facilities and services provided privately by doctors and other health 
care providers  owing to the so-called sorting of patients in which the poor make more 
use of public services while the more affluent seek care at private facilities. This 
decongests the public health system as only those who cannot afford private health 
care are able to access services at public health facilities56. Although quality may not 
be guaranteed under these circumstances, efficiency in the public health system is 
improved. 
The problem with the absenteeism caused by the abuse of RWOPS in South Africa is 
that those doctors who remain in the hospitals are burdened with additional work and 
are sometimes forced to perform tasks for which they are unqualified17. The financial 
costs of reduced productivity  owing to absenteeism can be high as shown by a study 
in Machakos District, Kenya, which estimated that the absenteeism rate, averaging 
25%, costs each health facility 51 000 USD per month57.  The abuse of RWOPS leads 
to unmanned working stations of doctors. Some of the adverse events that occur 
during this absenteeism   lead to medical negligence claims. South Africa has recently 
experienced a significant increase in medical negligence claims in terms of both size 
and frequency58. Medical negligence attorneys advertise their services in the media 
and encourage the community to approach them if they are not happy with the way 
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they were treated either by hospitals or health care providers. This increase in medical 
negligence claims has negative effects on the ability of the state to finance health care 
as funds, which are meant for service delivery in the already resource-limited and 
overburdened public health care system that serves the overwhelming majority of the 
population, are used to pay for medical negligence claims and related legal costs57.  
 
The theft of drugs and medical supplies by health care professionals is common 
globally. In Venezuela, approximately two-thirds of hospital personnel surveyed were 
aware of theft of medical supplies and medications. Similarly, in Costa Rica, 71% of 
doctors and 83 % of nurses reported that equipment or materials had been stolen in 
their hospital.  Theft has been found to increase when its potential benefit is high, 
when the probability of detection is low, and when the expected penalty is minor 59. 
There is likely to be a similar occurrence in South Africa given the weak or non-
existent controls at public health facilities. Resources which are meant to be used for 
patients in the public sector could be diverted to patients in the private sector. The cost 
per patient day equivalent for most public health facilities in South Africa is higher than 
the norm. A contributing factor60 to this is may be that most of these hospitals are 
inefficient in the utilisation of resources and there is a lack of drugs and other supplies 
owing to theft for use in the private sector. 
Besides the obvious outflow of public resources owing to theft, the use of the public 
sector’s means of transportation, office infrastructure, equipment and personnel, such 
as nurses and cleaners, when private patients are brought into the public sector for 
management by the doctor practising RWOPS represents additional hidden outflows 
of public sector resources to the private sector61. 
  
33 
 
Concluding remarks 
Although there is a paucity of evidence on the impact of abuse of RWOPS, it is clear 
from the above that, while RWOPS has a potential of bringing positive benefits to the 
public sector, these benefits are not realised owing to this practice being susceptible to 
abuse.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. Conclusion 
Remunerative Work Outside Public Service or Dual Practice was introduced by the 
state to allow for public servants, including doctors, to perform remunerative work 
outside the employment by the state. The benefits of RWOPS are not only monetary 
but they are also in the form of professional development as these doctors are able to 
maintain their clinical and technical skills through access to resources that are not 
readily available in the public sector. The state is also able to retain these skilled 
professionals within the public health system. Unfortunately, however, this practice 
that has the potential of enriching and empowering the state to ensure access to 
quality health care services by all South African has been abused by state-employed 
doctors. This situation has been made worse by the inability of the state to regulate 
the practice. 
This report has demonstrated that the Department of Health, as the employer, fully 
empowered by legislation, has failed to manage the performance of RWOPS by state-
employed doctors, and some of the doctors are exploiting the gap that exists. RWOPS 
policies developed by Provincial Departments of Health have not brought about a 
solution to the problem of the abuse of RWOPS. All that the state needs to do is to 
observe the provisions of the Public Service Act as stated above.  
 
The performance of RWOPS by doctors without permission from the executive 
authority is illegal. The failure of the employer or the state to exercise the provisions of 
section 31 of the Public Service Act by recovering the remuneration made by doctors 
performing RWOPS is not only illegal but also unethical. After a cabinet decision to 
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abolish LPP in 1999, the ownership of private practices by full-time state-employed 
doctors is illegal and unethical. From this report, it can be concluded that both the 
state and doctors are culpable as regards breaches of the Constitution, Public Service 
Act, Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Labour Relations Act. 
 
This report has successfully demonstrated that doctors who abuse RWOPS have 
deviated from their moral duties towards their patients and are also in breach of not 
only their legal obligations towards the state but also the ethical guidelines of the 
HPCSA as the regulatory body. These doctors are not trustworthy and are devoid of 
integrity which are basic virtues expected from a medical professional. The shift from 
the best interest of the patient to self-interest is a serious threat to the profession 
which has always been known for its benevolence. SAMA has also failed in its duty of 
guiding and uniting the doctors to have the best interest of patients at heart based on 
the commitment that the medical profession has made through the agreements signed 
in the PSCBC 
Although there is a paucity of evidence on the impact of abuse of RWOPS, this report 
has made it clear that, while RWOPS has a potential of bringing positive benefits to 
the public sector, these benefits are not realised owing to the practice being 
susceptible to abuse. It has been demonstrated that absenteeism is the major form of 
abuse of RWOPS in the public service. It is equivalent to corruption, and this has an 
impact on the ability of the state to provide accessible, equitable and efficient health 
care services using the available resources within the public service. This behaviour 
by state-employed doctors is unethical as it is motivated by self-interest and perverse 
incentives both of which are in violation of the ethical guidelines of the HPCSA. The 
denial of public sector patients to much needed health care owing to unavailability of 
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doctors and the receiving of low quality care is both illegal and unethical as it denies 
patients their constitutional right of access to health care services and is reflective of 
the injustices of the past where quality health care services were available only to the 
privileged minority.  
 
While a significant limitation of this report is the paucity of evidence-based and 
empirical research on this topic, the report has successfully argued that RWOPS, as 
currently practiced by state-employed doctors, lends itself to significant abuse and 
hence, both unethical and illegal conduct. 
5.2. Recommendations 
The legal and ethical implications pertaining to the abuse of RWOPS by state-
employed doctors require an intervention, not only from the state as employer but also 
from all the relevant stakeholders, and I, therefore, recommend as follows: 
1. The Department of Health as employer should apply the provisions of the law to 
the letter without fear or favour. The state should recover the income obtained 
by doctors as a result of engaging in RWOPS without approval in accordance 
with section 31 of the Public Service Act. 
2. Absenteeism, corruption and theft should be dealt with using the provisions of 
the Disciplinary Code and Procedure in the public service, and those found 
guilty of misconduct should be reported to the HPCSA for unprofessional 
conduct. 
3. The HPCSA should include a rule related to dual practice in the Ethical Rules 
developed in terms of section 49 of the Health Professions Act. 
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4. The Department of Health and the HPCSA should develop a working protocol 
to manage complaints related to the abuse of RWOPS lodged with the HPCSA 
for unprofessional conduct. 
5. SAMA should assist doctors by ensuring that they understand the obligations 
they have towards the employer as outlined in their employment contracts and 
refrain from advocating for unethical doctors who are involved in illegal 
practices. 
6. If RWOPS is not abolished in South Africa, a system of regulating and 
managing RWOPS needs to be developed through a collaboration of the 
Department of Health, SAMA, HPCSA and the Medical Deans with a view to 
having a national policy on RWOPS to which both doctors and the state will be 
committed. 
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